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Private landowners in South Africa conserve roughly 40% of white rhinos glob-
ally. Given concerns that escalating poaching has caused private-rhino owners to
disinvest, we used a national survey to assess 171 private-rhino owners’ responses
to the crisis. Twenty-eight percent of rhino owners are disinvesting in rhino,
57% are pursuing business-as-usual (largely ecotourism), and 15% are investing
in more rhinos. It is currently unclear whether this diversity in private-rhino
owners’ responses to the crisis is increasing the resilience of the rhino popu-
lation to poaching. Some rhino investors show signs of financial stress. Most
owners support rhino-horn trade to fund conservation, yet international trade
remains banned. By contrast, a recent national policy amendment allows rhinos
to be managed as livestock, risking a shift from rhino-for-conservation to rhino-
for-production on private land. Our findings highlight an urgent need to ensure
policies keep pace with dynamic socioeconomic environments that influence the
sustainability of wildlife use.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The supply of lucrative illegal markets with horn through
rhino poaching is a high-profile conservation crisis. The
rate of poaching of southern Africa’s white rhino Cera-
totherium simum in core populations is close to the species’
annual growth rate, with scientists warning of possible
extinction of rhino in the wild within decades (Biggs,
Courchamp, Martin, & Possingham, 2013; Di Minin et al.,
2015; Ferreira et al., 2015). These predictions, together with
increasing rhino security costs, have led to calls for an
international legal trade in rhino horn, which is currently
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prohibited by the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).
Proponents argue that nonlethal, sustainable harvesting
of horn from live rhinos would shift market control into
legal channels; with a steady supply of legal horn substan-
tially reducing the illegal market and generating conser-
vation revenues (Biggs et al., 2013; Child, 2012; Di Minin
et al., 2015). Others argue that, given the uncertain effects
of legal trade on consumer demand, rhino horn prices,
and transaction costs in supply chains, competition from
illegal traders would undermine legal trade and worsen
poaching of vulnerable populations (Bulte & Damania,
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2005; Collins, Fraser, & Snowball, 2013; Fischer, 2004). The
conservation success of a legal trade approach has been
argued to depend on the existence of appropriate institu-
tional arrangements (Collins, Fraser, & Snowball, 2016).
South Africa conserves about 86% of the world’s esti-
mated 18,000 white rhinos (Emslie et al., 2019). The coun-
try’s success in conserving rhinos has been partially due
to its inclusion of private landowners in rhino ownership
since the 1960s (Linklater & Shrader, 2017). The opportu-
nity to (a) purchase white rhinos from their last remaining
population in Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Park (and more recently
from other national parks and reserves) and (b) offer lim-
ited trophy hunting at high prices (averaging 90 individu-
als/year since 2004; Online Appendix 1), incentivized pri-
vate landowners to conserve and trade rhinos (Cooney
et al., 2017; ’t Sas-Rolfes, 1995). Private landowners own a
growing percentage of South Africa’s white rhinos, which
is approaching 50% (Online Appendix 2; Emslie et al.,
2019). There are increasing concerns, however, that the
financial benefits from rhino ecotourism, trophy hunting,
and live sales are becoming insufficient to offset increased
security costs and financial risks arising from rhino poach-
ing, reducing the live-rhino trade value (Online Appendix
3) and causing private-rhino owners to opt out (Emslie
et al., 2019; Ferreira, Pfab, & Knight, 2014). It is argued
by some that policy has not kept pace with the chang-
ing cost–benefit ratio (Child, 2012), and small-sample sur-
veys of private-rhino owners document support for pol-
icy changes to legalize international horn trade (Rubino
& Pienaar, 2018; Wright, Cundill, & Biggs, 2016). Despite
these concerns, there has not been a nationwide assess-
ment of trends in howprivate-rhino owners are responding
to the poaching crisis, amidst uncertainty regarding trade
legalization.
Private landowner involvement in conservation in South
Africa comes with diverse motivations and management
strategies (Child, Peel, Smit, & Sutherland, 2013; Clements
&Cumming, 2017; Rubino&Pienaar, 2018). Ecological the-
ory suggests that there is a generally positive relationship
between the diversity of elements in a system and system
resilience. In more diverse ecosystems, it is less likely that
disturbance that causes species losses will cause the loss
of entire ecosystem functions, due to diversity in species’
responses to the disturbance (Oliver et al., 2015; Tilman,
1999). Although this relationship is less well established
in social-ecological systems, it is predicted that systems
with diverse people and institutions (e.g.) may be more
effective at responding to change because diversity gives
rise to higher levels of innovation, adaptation, and resis-
tance (Biggs et al., 2012; De Vos & Cumming, 2019; Leslie
& McCabe, 2013). It could, therefore, be hypothesized that
the involvement of private landowners in rhino conserva-
tion increases South Africa’s resilience to the poaching cri-
sis (i.e., the country’s capacity to conserve rhinos in the
face of poaching). In addition to increasing the extent of
rhino habitat and doubling the number of rhinos, if private
landowner responses to the crisis are more diverse than on
state land alone, theymay increase the likelihood of at least
one response strategy being effective in conserving rhinos.
Although some owners may be disinvesting in rhinos due
to growing financial burdens and risks, others may be bet-
ter equipped to increase antipoaching security ormove rhi-
nos out of poaching hotspots.
Private-rhino owners have now had a decade to develop
strategies in response to the escalation of poaching. This
study makes use of the largest database of private-rhino
owners to undertake the first nationwide, quantitative
analysis of private-rhino owner responses to the poach-
ing crisis, addressing a key knowledge gap. Three distinct
responses by rhino owners emerge: disinvest, business-as-
usual, and invest. We discuss the possible consequences
and policy implications of this response diversity for rhino
conservation going forward, considering rhino-owners’
perspectives on legalizing horn trade.
2 METHODS
Members of the South African Private Rhino Owners’
Association (PROA) were surveyed in 2015 and 2018,
adapting a previously developed protocol (Hall-Martin
et al., 2008). The survey was distributed to 339 (2015)
and 285 (2018) rhino owners via email. Participation
in all questions was voluntary. Attempts were made
to elicit responses from nonrespondents by telephone.
The 2015 survey (Online Appendix 4) included ques-
tions on property size; involvement in rhino sales, hunt-
ing and ecotourism; rhino-security costs; and the num-
ber of rhinos and poaching incidents on the property.
Owners were asked whether they supported legal-horn
trade and intensive-rhino farming, and whether they
would participate in these activities should horn trade be
legalized.
Owners indicated on a categorical scale bywhat percent-
age their security costs had increased since the escalation
of poaching in 2008, and what percentage of their rhinos
they had sold and intended selling due to poaching risks,
or moved to a safer site. They were asked whether they
had sold land that once carried rhinos to nonrhino owners,
howmany hectares of land they had bought on which they
have or plan to have rhinos, and how many rhinos they
had released onto their property or sold from their prop-
erty, from 2012 to 2014.
The 2018 survey was a shorter version of the 2015 survey.
It omitted questions on the percentage of rhinos sold over-
all due to poaching risks, security cost increases since the
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F IGURE 1 Biplot depicting the relative scores of eight response
variables on the first two principal components (PCs), depicting
rhino-owner responses to the poaching crisis. Data points indi-
cate the scores of 99 rhino owners, with shapes corresponding to
the three identified clusters (● Disinvestors; ▲ Business-as-usual;
■ Investors). High similarity in arrow direction indicates high posi-
tive correlation between corresponding variables, while high dissim-
ilarity in arrow direction indicates high negative correlation between
variables; perpendicular arrows represent unrelated variables
escalation of poaching, and owner support for intensive-
rhino farming.
A principal component analysis was performed, fol-
lowed by a cluster analysis, to investigate diversity in
rhino-owners’ responses to the poaching crisis, employing
Euclidean distance and Ward linkages (R package: vegan;
functions: rda, vegdist, hclust) (Oksanen et al., 2015; Ward,
1963). A Mantel-based comparison was used to determine
the number of distinct clusters of owners (R package: clus-
ter; functions: daisy, silhouette) (Maechler et al., 2015).
Only respondents who completed all questions regarding
their responses to poaching were included in the analy-
sis. Responses of owners in each cluster were compared
with Kruskal–WallisH tests (continuous, nonnormal data)
or Fisher’s exact tests (count data). We then compared
the average and aggregate characteristics of properties and
owners in each distinct cluster.
The shorter 2018 survey prevented a thorough compari-
sonwith the 2015 survey responses.We compared the num-
ber of rhinos bought and sold, land area bought, and rhino-
security costs (Kruskal–Wallis H tests), and the number of
owners who intended selling rhinos due to poaching risks,
participate in hunting, and support and would participate
in legal-horn trade (Chi-square tests).
3 RESULTS
Of the 171 responses to the 2015 survey, 132 landowners col-
lectively owned 4,458 white rhinos across 1.3 million ha in
2014 (33.8 ± 8.7 rhino/property). An additional 18 respon-
dents owned rhinos in 2012 or 2013 but no longer in 2014.
A total of 345 rhinos were poached between 2012 and 2014
(2.7 ± 0.6 rhino/property; 2.9 ± 0.6% of rhinos/year). The
77 respondents to the follow-up survey collectively owned
4,226 rhinos in 2017 (54.9 ± 20.0 rhino/property), with 74
rhinos poached in 2017 (1.0 ± 0.4 rhino/property).
Three distinct clusters of owners emerged, based on
their responses to poaching (Mantel r = 0.53, n = 99;
Figure 1). The first cluster (28% of owners; Figure 1 “Disin-
vestors”) was characterized by owners who responded to
the crisis by selling a percentage of their rhinos (Table 1),
with a third of owners selling > 67% of their rhinos. Two
thirds of owners intended selling more rhinos due to
poaching risks. Two thirds of owners had increased their
security costs by > 67%, while few had moved rhinos to a
safer location or purchased more land.
The largest cluster (57% of owners; Figure 1 “Business-
as-usual”) tended to have neither sold rhinos (none
selling > 33% of their rhinos) nor bought rhinos or land
in response to the crisis, nor did they intend selling
rhinos (Table 1). Only 4% of owners had moved rhinos,
moving < 33% of their rhinos. A quarter of owners had not
increased their security costs.
The smallest cluster (15% of owners; Figure 1
“Investors”) tended to have moved a percentage of
their rhinos to an alternative safer site (Table 1), with a
third of owners moving > 67% of their rhinos, usually
within South Africa. No owners had sold > 33% of their
rhinos in response to poaching risks. Many had purchased
more rhinos and land. All owners had increased their
security costs, with the majority increasing costs by >67%.
Investors owned the largest properties on average, while
business-as-usual owned the smallest properties, though
high variability meant the difference was not significant
(Table 2). Business-as-usual collectively owned 40% of the
land area supporting rhinos; disinvestors owned 36% of
the land. On average, investors owned significantly more
rhinos than the other clusters, owning 45% of all rhinos.
Disinvestors owned 30% of all rhinos. Investors and disin-
vestors had higher rhino densities on their properties than
business-as-usual. Investors had on average lost the most
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TABLE 1 Responses of rhino owners in three distinct clusters to the poaching crisis
Responses Disinvestors Business-as-usual Investors Significance test
Proportion of owners who sold rhinos from 2012 to
2014 due to poaching risks
0.71 0.39 0.47 Fisher’s p < .001*
Average number of rhinos sold from 2012 to 2014 7.0 (±1.6) 0.9 (±0.2) 4.3 (±1.7) H = 14.9, df = 2, p < .001*
Proportion of owners who intend selling rhinos due to
poaching risks
0.68 0.13 0.20 Fisher’s p < .001*
Proportion of owners who moved rhinos to an
alternative safer site
0.07 0.04 0.47 Fisher’s p < .001*
Average hectares bought from 2012 to 2014 on which
the owner has/plans to have rhinos
137 (±93) 216 (±76) 6,015 (±276) H = 16.8, df = 2, p < .001*
Average number of rhinos released onto property from
2012 to 2014
2.3 (±0.9) 1.4 (±0.4) 41.9 (±22.0) H = 3.2, df = 2, p = .2
Proportion of owners who increased their security
costs by >67% since the escalation of poaching in
2008
0.68 0.38 0.93 Fisher’s p < .001*
Proportion of owners who had not increased security
costs since 2008
0.07 0.23 0 Fisher’s p = .035*
*Significant.
TABLE 2 Summary statistics of the characteristics of rhino owners and properties in each response cluster
Characteristics Disinvestors Business-as-usual Investors Significance test
Average property size 2014 (ha) 14,223 (±4,256) 8,109 (±1,494) 17,317 (±6,191) H = 3.9, df = 2, p = .1
Total area 2014 (ha) 384,018 437,907 259,750 NA
Average number of rhinos 2014 38.7 (±9.3) 16.3 (±4.3) 109.9 (±70.1) H = 8.2, df = 2, p = .016*
Total number of rhinos 2014 1,083 915 1649 NA
Average number of rhinos per 1,000 ha 33.1 (±28.7) 5.2 (±1.4) 16.7 (±10.5) H = 3.6, df = 2, p = .2
Average number of rhinos lost to poaching 2012–2014 1.2 (±0.4) 1.6 (±0.5) 4.8 (±1.8) H = 3.7, df = 2, p = .2
Total number of rhinos lost to poaching 2012–2014 34 89 72 NA
Average rhino security costs 2014 (ZAR1,000) 598 (±262) 143 (±39) 366 (±248) H = 1.6, df = 2, p = .4
Proportion of owners in support of hunting 0.85 0.49 0.93 Fisher’s p < .001*
Proportion of owners in support of horn trade 0.93 0.77 0.93 Fisher’s p = .1
Proportion of owners in support of intensification 0.75 0.69 0.79 Fisher’s p = .7
Proportion of owners who participate in hunting 0.30 0.13 0.33 Fisher’s p = .07
Proportion of owners who would participate in horn
trade
0.86 0.70 1.00 Fisher’s p = .02*
Proportion of owners who would participate in
intensification
0.46 0.29 0.60 Fisher’s p = .045*
*Significant.
rhinos to poaching, but the business-as-usual cluster had
the highest total number of rhinos poached.
Support for legal trophy hunting, horn trade, and inten-
sive rhino farming was generally high among owners
(Table 2). Horn trade received more support than hunting
or intensive farming and was highest among investors and
lowest among business-as-usual. More owners would par-
ticipate in trade than intensification, with the highest par-
ticipation among investors and lowest among business-as-
usual.
Investors tended to generate a higher proportion of
their revenue through rhino-trophy hunting than the
other two clusters (Figure 2). Business-as-usual generated
a higher proportion of revenue through rhino ecotourism
and disinvestors were most dependent on live-rhino
sales. Business-as-usual was the only cluster with owners
located across all nine provinces (Figure 3). More than
two thirds of disinvestors and investors were in three and
two provinces, respectively.
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F IGURE 2 The proportion of respondents in each response
cluster of private-rhino owners, who generated categorical percent-
ages of property revenue from rhino hunting, ecotourism, and live
sales, across the three clusters of private-rhino owners
F IGURE 3 The proportion of respondents in each response
cluster of private-rhino owners, whose properties were located in
each of South Africa’s nine provinces. Provinces are kept anonymous
to protect sensitive information on property locations
Trends in the responses of owners to the poaching crisis
in the 2015 and 2018 surveys were largely similar (Table 3).
Significant differences were only apparent in the increased
average land area purchased and increased spending on
rhino security.
4 DISCUSSION
Response diversity was evident in the strategies adopted by
private-rhino owners in the face of an escalating poaching
crisis. Twenty-eight percent of owners in our sample, who
collectively owned roughly a third of both the rhinos and
the land (Table 3), were actively disinvesting in rhinos, sup-
porting concerns that poaching will cause private-rhino
owners to opt out (Emslie et al., 2019; Ferreira et al., 2014).
By contrast, 15% of owners were purchasing land and rhi-
nos in response to the poaching crisis. Although one rhino
owner has gained media attention for this strategy (Stod-
dard, 2019), the extent of this response has not previously
been documented.
Disinvestors increased their security costs and were sell-
ing rhinos, suggesting that they cannot afford rhino losses
to poaching and the growing costs of mitigating this risk
(>ZAR1.5 million/property on average in 2017). This find-
ing supports predictions that if the financial costs of con-
serving rhinos on private land outweigh the financial ben-
efits, landowners will disinvest (Child, 2012; Ferreira et al.,
2014). The 75% drop in live-rhino auction price, coupled
with the dramatic reduction in live-rhino sales in recent
years (Online Appendix 3), is likely to be at least partly
driven by this disinvestment in rhino, as well as further
disincentivizing owners from keeping rhinos. Most disin-
vestors would participate in legal-horn trade, suggesting
that such trade opportunities may curb disinvestment.
Investors, who owned 45% of all rhinos, had increased
their rhino-security costs considerably and were buying
rhino and land despite experiencing the most poaching
incidents. Investors thus appear better-equipped finan-
cially than disinvestors to cope with the growing costs of
owning rhino. Although these owners show resilience to
poaching thus far, possibly benefitting from the reduced
rhino prices and the supply from disinvestors, whether
this strategy will result in resilient rhino conservation in
the long term remains unknown. All owners in this cate-
gory would participate in legal-horn trade, and some have
TABLE 3 Comparison of rhino-owner responses to surveys issued in 2015 (for year 2014) and 2018 (for year 2017)
Responses 2014 2017 Significance test
Average number of rhinos sold from the property that year 1.12 (±0.24) 2.28 (±0.57) H = 3.3, df = 1, p = .07
Proportion of owners who intend selling rhinos due to poaching risks 0.32 0.37 X2 = 0.3, df = 1, p = .6
Hectares bought that year on which the owner has or plans to have rhinos 481 (±295) 764 (±634) H = 44.6, df = 1, p < .001*
Average number of rhinos released onto property that year 2.72 (±1.16) 1.09 (±0.37) H = 0.2, df = 1, p = .7
Average rhino security costs (ZAR1,000) 301.55 (±82.83) 1,558.70 (±458.35) H = 44.6, df = 1, p < .001*
Proportion of owners who participate in hunting 0.20 0.28 X2 = 1.0, df = 1, p = .3
Proportion of owners in support of horn trade 0.84 0.80 X2 = 0.3, df = 1, p = .6
Proportion of owners who would participate in horn trade 0.80 0.74 X2 = 0.6, df = 1, p = .4
*Significant.
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invested in rhinos in anticipation of horn-trade legalization
(see, e.g., Stoddard, 2019; some landowners are understood
to be banking on benefitting from legal sales of rhino horn
at ∼USD23,000/kg, P. Jones, personal communication).
There is thus uncertainty regarding how long these own-
ers can finance their investments should live-rhino prices
continue to fall and horn trade remain illegal. The largest
investor in rhino claims that he is approaching bankruptcy
(Stoddard, 2019).
The final and largest group of rhino owners displayed
limited changes to their activities in response to poaching.
They tended to have low rhino densities and generate
revenue from ecotourism. Although rhinos are popular
among ecotourists (Hausmann et al., 2018), the revenue
generated by ecotourism (compared with rhino sales and
hunting) is not directly dependent on rhino numbers.
Ecotourism properties may, therefore, be less sensitive to
poaching and less inclined to invest heavily in security.
Furthermore, the widespread distribution of business-
as-usual properties (Figure 3) suggests that many fall
outside of current poaching hotspots in the savanna biome
near South Africa’s north-eastern borders, where many
investors and disinvestors are located.
Although the majority of private-rhino owners support
horn trade, far fewer would farm rhinos to supply this
trade. Those who would intensify tended to be investors
and disinvestors, who already had higher rhino numbers
and densities than the business-as-usual owners. These
findings suggest that, while many private landowners
believe that they would benefit from horn trade through
its likely effect on the value of live rhinos (Ferreira et al.,
2014) and through horn sales, the diversity of landowner
business models would reduce the risk that all private-
rhino properties become homogenized breeding grounds
for intensively managed or “nonwild” rhinos. Interpreta-
tion of our results should, however, consider that rhino
owners undertaking less acceptable or illegal activities, or
those wishing to remain “below the radar,” may have been
less likely to respond to the survey, possibly biasing these
findings.
At this stage, it is unclear whether the response diver-
sity present among private-rhino owners will ultimately
increase South Africa’s resilience to the poaching crisis,
with limited signs of change in either poaching rates or
international trade regulations. What is apparent is that
enabling private-rhino ownership has diversified conser-
vation options. The primary strategy adopted by state-
owned parks in response to poaching (in South Africa and
continentally) has been to increase security and promote
the growth of rhino populations (Balfour, Barichievy, Gor-
don, & Brett, 2019). The historic auctioning of rhinos from
Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Park, and more recent translocation
of rhinos to private land outside poaching hotspots, rep-
resents an additional strategy to spread risk across many,
smaller reserves that are potentially easier to secure (Lin-
klater & Shrader, 2017). The former strategy is largely
dependent on ongoing conservation funding, while the
latter depends on the willingness of (and incentives to)
private landowners to purchase rhinos (Ferreira et al.,
2014). The combined conservation and financial motives
and means of private-rhino owners (Rubino & Pienaar,
2018) enabled diversity in rhino conservation strategies.
Although rhino numbers have been declining on state
reserves, they were still increasing on private land as
of 2017, depicting a growing reliance on private land
for white-rhino conservation (Online Appendix 2; Emslie
et al., 2019).
South Africa is currently at a crossroad. Regardless
of whether private-rhino owners are already opting out,
investing or continuing as usual, many are experiencing
rising costs. The majority support legalizing international
horn trade to equilibrate the cost–benefit ratio. Some own-
ers emphasize the need for government to regulate the
intensification that may arise if trade is legalized (Rubino,
Pienaar, & Soto, 2018; Wright et al., 2016), given its uncer-
tain consequences for the conservation of wild populations
(Sanderson et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2017). Seemingly
contrary to this, the government recently gazetted a list
of 33 wildlife species, including white and black rhino,
which can now be treated as livestock under the Animal
Improvement Act (Kamuti, 2019; Somers et al., 2020). This
action risks shifting the focus of private-rhino ownership
from rhinos-for-conservation to rhinos-for-production. In
2017, a tightly controlled, domestic rhino-horn trade was
legalized in South Africa, but has yielded limited returns
given the lack of an international market (Emslie et al.,
2019). Our findings highlight the urgent need to (a) keep
track of both state- and private-rhino populations and
management strategies (which currently is not happening
at an appropriate level), (b) track the potential conserva-
tion impact of the recent recognition of rhinos as livestock,
and (c) adapt and align international and national policies
to incentivize rhino conservation over rhino production or
rhino disinvestment. These findings speak to a global need
for the policies that determine how people and countries
can manage and use their wildlife to keep pace with
dynamic socioeconomic changes (e.g., increased illegal
trade, changing market dynamics, an increasing antihunt-
ing lobby, local institutional contexts, and global economic
shocks such as that caused by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic),
amidst criticism that international policies, such as
CITES, are misaligned with national-level strategies for
conserving wildlife (Abensperg-Traun, 2009; Challender,
Harrop, & MacMillan, 2015; Frank &Wilcove, 2019).
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